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ABSTRACT

The first major controversy of New York City's new Community School District System has revolved around the allocation of funds available under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The uproar started when the Board of Education announced the allocations for the districts in the last moments before the 1970-71 year was to begin. The community school boards saw immediately that these allocations would mean drastic reductions in the funds available to them for locally developed Title I programs. In the resulting angry reaction by the community boards most of the attention has been on the specific hardships of the districts involved. Much broader issues are, however, involved: the general question of allocations of all funds, the rights and powers of the community boards, the relationships between the teachers' union and local and central authorities, and, indeed, the whole concept of decentralization itself. (Author/JM)

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The Title I Controversy

September 1970

The first major controversy of the city's new Community School District System has revolved around an age-old problem: a fight over the allocation of funds — in this case those available under Title I of the Federal Elementary and Secondary School Act.

The uproar started when the Board of Education announced the allocations for the districts in the last moments before the 1970-71 year was to begin. The community school boards saw immediately that these allocations would mean drastic reductions in the funds available to many of them for locally developed Title I programs.

In the resulting angry reaction by the community boards, most of the attention has been on the specific hardships of the districts involved. Much broader issues are involved, however: the general question of allocations of *all* funds, the rights and powers of the community boards, the relationships between the teachers' union and local and central authorities, and, indeed, the whole concept of decentralization itself.

NEW YORK CITY'S TITLE I APPROPRIATION

"Title I funds" are those federal monies available under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), the purpose of which is to provide supplementary education funds for disadvantaged children. The funds, which are channelled through state governments to local school districts, are allocated by the federal government on the basis of a specific formula: New York City's maximum possible grant under Title I is determined by multiplying fifty percent of the New York State average per pupil expenditure by the number of "disadvantaged children" in the City.

As defined in the federal law, "disadvantaged children" are those school age children in families with less than $2,000 annual income as measured in the 1960 census and those in families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADC), plus certain children in special schools and child-care institutions. Although the maximum grant has never been achieved because Congress has never appropriated sufficient funds, the amount of money that New York City receives bears a direct relationship to its number of "disadvantaged children." In recent years the city's Title I grant has exceeded $100 *million* dollars, making it by far the most important special grant program. New York City, because of its large number of "disadvantaged children" and the high state per pupil expenditure, receives almost 10% of the entire federal Title I appropriation.

Prior to school year 1970-71, Title I funds received by New York City were expended within the City at the discretion of the Board of Education. So long as nonpublic school obligations were fulfilled and the public schools served met Title I eligibility criteria, the Board of Education apparently did not feel constrained to divide funds between the central Board and the local districts or among the local districts on an equitable formula basis.[1]

THE NEW DECENTRALIZATION LAW

The new Decentralization Law, which went into effect on July 1, 1970, eliminated this kind of discretion from the distribution of Title I funds. It granted community school boards jurisdiction over prekindergarten through intermediate schools while retaining for the central Board jurisdiction over the high schools, special education, and rather narrowly defined citywide programs. Implementing that grant of authority, the law went on to provide that "formula funds" such as Title I be distributed by formula directly to the community boards for their discretionary use in the schools under their jurisdiction. It set forth a procedure whereby each community board would submit proposals up to the dollar limit of its formula allocation, stipulating that these proposals could be reviewed by the Chancellor "as to form only," thereby explicitly prohibiting the central Board from exercising any substantive control over community board programs.

The law required that the formula for distribution be developed by the Board of Education in consultation with the community school boards and that it "reflect the same educational and economic factors as

[1]This attitude prevailed despite the fact that the Board of Education's own "Guidelines to Decentralization," in effect during the school years 1968-69 and 1969-70, specified that "the city Board will apportion the total funds available on an equitable basis, among local school boards."

the formula for apportionment of such special funds to the city district." Thus the funds would be distributed among the districts in proportion to their number of "disadvantaged children" as measured by the federal criteria. Funds for centrally run programs would also presumably be limited to those earned by "disadvantaged children" under the central jurisdiction.

The "jurisdictional," "formula," and "as to form only" provisions of the Decentralization Law make clear the intent of the legislature to give the community boards both their fair share of the Title I money and control over the programs funded by it. The "jurisdictional" and "formula" provisions also serve to preclude the central board from operating programs for pupils under community board jurisdiction, specifying that it can have neither the right nor the funds to do so.

In order to comply with the restrictions and requirements of the Decentralization Law, the Board of Education had to reallocate Title I funds for 1970-1971 — a task complicated by past inequities, conflicting obligations, and rising costs. It was also a task that contained within it the seeds of political conflict, because implicit in the reallocation of funds was the termination of existing programs in which communities had a great deal at stake in terms of service provided, effort invested, and jobs generated.

PAST INEQUITIES

In 1969-1970, New York City received Title I funds in the amount of $117 million — or approximately 7% of its operating budget. The sum was divided by the Board of Education into two major parts: one for administrative costs, contingencies, nonpublic school programs, and centrally run programs; the other for decentralized projects.

Centrally Run Programs

The centrally run programs served disadvantaged children throughout the city at every level of the school system, but were not provided on a formula basis; rather, service seemed to follow space availability and administrative fiat. For example, because of the difficulty in locating sufficient space in poverty area schools to accommodate the many small classes required by the "More Effective Schools" program, District 31 (Staten Island), with only 2,800 eligible children but available space, was able to secure two "More Effective Schools" whereas District 7 (South Bronx), with 18,000 eligible children but no space, was unable to obtain any.

Decentralized Funds

The funds reserved for decentralized projects were distributed throughout the city under a formula devised by the Board of Education. Allocations were first made to the boroughs on the basis of each borough's total number of "disadvantaged children" as measured in the federal formula. Within the boroughs, funds were allocated to local school districts on the basis only of the number of students meeting certain poverty eligibility criteria *in schools that qualified for Title I aid* (i.e., "Title I eligible schools" — see Appendix I). Moreover, instead of determining the number of eligible pupils in qualifying schools by the federal formula (those in families of under $2,000 income or on ADC), the Board counted the number eligible for free lunch. As the free lunch total was readily available in each school, this was a much simpler procedure than having to develop individual school totals by adjusting ADC figures (which existed only in terms of health districts) and determining the actual number of children enrolled who came from families with incomes of less than $2,000.

Although the "decentralized" funds were thus distributed by a formula, this procedure did not comply with the Decentralization Law's new requirement that the formula governing distribution of Title I funds to community boards "reflect the *same* educational and economic factors" as the formula under which funds are allocated to the City (emphasis added). There is no basis for assuming that the number of children receiving free lunch is an accurate measure of the number meeting the federal poverty criteria.[2]

It can be seen, therefore, that inequities in the use of Title I funds prior to 1970-1971 resulted both from an unsystematic distribution of central programs and a method of allocating decentralized funds that did not follow the federal formula.

THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH THE DECENTRALIZATION LAW

On June 15, 1970 and again on July 6, 1970 the Central Board issued the following statement of its overall policy concerning the distribution of Title I funds:

> In line with the Decentralization Act, the Board of Education is *moving toward* distributing all Title I E.S.E.A. monies on a formula basis. Certain basic programs *will be continued* in line with the Board's commitments. (Emphasis added.)

For the coming year, "moving toward" compliance meant that the Board did not intend to distribute the funds among the districts on a strict formula basis. The statement that "certain basic programs will be continued" meant that the districts would be required to use a portion of their still inequitably distributed funds to support certain "mandated" programs provided for in the United Federation of Teachers' (UFT) union contract. The problem of "mandated" programs became a key issue in the ensuing struggle, quite aside from the issue of whether such programs can legally be part of the union contract.

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[2]See Appendix II for a discussion of the free lunch index.

Mandated Programs

The three so-called "mandated" programs in the UFT contract which have been supported by Title I funds are: "More Effective Schools" (MES), "Strengthened Early Childhood" (SEC), and "Special Primary Schools." All of these programs call for extra staffing and hence considerable extra costs.

In 1969-70 the 21 MES schools were distributed throughout disadvantaged areas of the city without regard to any formula and mostly on the basis of space available. In 18 of the schools the extra costs were paid from Title I funds; in the other three, not "Title I eligible schools," they were paid out of tax levy funds. For 1970-71 the union contract called for adding ten new MES schools, but when it became evident that the tentative "space available" distribution would increase the inequities (districts with two MES schools getting a third while other poor districts still had none), three of the new designations were cancelled still leaving the distribution very uneven.

The "Strengthened Early Childhood" program is designed to reduce the adult-pupil ratio in kindergarten, first and second grades. Since the funds are apportioned among the schools in proportion to the *total* number of children in these grades, rather than in proportion to the number of "disadvantaged children," the distribution does not follow the federal formula. Since the funds go to all eligible schools, however, the discrepancy is not as great as in the MES program.

Since the "Special Primary" program covers only five schools, it is of necessity not equitably distributed among the districts.

For the 1970-71 school year the Board of Education was faced with the dilemma of having to comply with the new Decentralization Law which compelled it to distribute Title I funds to the districts by formula for their discretionary use and, at the same time, having to pay for these inequitably distributed and centrally designed "mandated" programs called for in the union contract. The problem was made even more difficult because the costs of these programs has greatly increased through negotiated wage increases and the expansion of the MES program.

"Phasing" and Redistribution

The Board's basic approach to this dilemma was to "phase" the inequitable distributions toward a formula distribution over a three year period. The July 6th distribution called for each district with "mandated" programs to receive an allotment of Title I funds to cover two-thirds of the costs of these programs, while the other one-third was to be redistributed by formula. In the case of "Strengthened Early Childhood," which existed in all Title I eligible districts, the one-third was redistributed among *all* these districts; in the case of MES and "Special Primary," one-third of the costs of each program was distributed by formula only among the districts which did not have that program.[3] The funds left over after all these distributions were then distributed among all the districts by formula. The idea was that those districts which had been receiving more than their fair share of the funds because they had "mandated" programs would have to start paying one-third of the costs of these programs out of "their own" funds. Since under the distribution scheme devised, however, some of the districts with heavy obligations for maintaining "mandated" programs would not have enough funds to pay even this one-third, an extra distribution was made so that every district would have at least enough to pay its share of "mandated" program costs, plus $50,000 for locally designed programs. Some five or six districts benefitted from this extra distribution.

If the amounts tied up in "mandated" and other central programs had been small, the Board might have gotten away with this approach to the problem even though it did violate the new law's requirement for a formula distribution. But the amounts were not small.

In the first place, of the $110,000,000 which the Board estimated as the total Title I funds available, $5.8 million were allocated to "Central Administration and Evaluation" and $18.9 million (17.2%) were set aside for "Central Programs."[4] (It may be noted in passing that no data were given to show whether the amounts for central purposes bore any relationship to the proportion of "disadvantaged children" in the high schools and other programs under central jurisdiction; the amounts were apparently just the costs — the increased costs at that — of the programs the central Board decided to keep.)[5] Also under central control, although the major portion was purportedly for ultimate decentralization, was a large allocation of $12.2 million to "Contingency Funds," including $2.8 million for the three "More Effective Schools" still to be designated, $6.78 million as a "Reserve for Innovation and Experimentation" (reputedly for the purpose of paying for anticipated increases in paraprofessional salaries in both central and local programs), and $2.6 million "To be Distributed to Districts for Nonpublic" schools.

Under the heading of "Distribution to Districts and Schools," $4.5 million were set aside for nonpublic schools and $3.84 million for "District Designed Open

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[3]The President of the Board has since said that the distribution in the case of MES and SEC was a "clerical error" which the Board determined to correct so that all the districts would receive a formula distribution of 1/3 of the costs of these programs. If distribution only to districts without these programs were continued for three years the districts which had been operating these programs would end up with none of the funds for them, and the "have-not" districts would have accumulated all of these funds.

[4]See Appendix III, "Title I ESEA Funds and Distribution: July 23, 1970."

[5]One program which the Board decided to keep central was "Follow Through," an elementary school program under the jurisdiction of the community boards.

Enrollment" programs to take care of children attending schools outside their districts to promote racial integration. Then $48.5 million, the largest slice of all, was designated for "mandated" programs to be distributed on the two-thirds/one-third basis described above. (Over $800 per child, for instance, was set aside for the extra costs of MES schools, making these schools almost twice as costly as regular elementary schools.)

After all these funds had been allocated, *only $16.25 million of the original $110 million was left for distribution to the districts* by formula for their own use. Even including the one-third of the cost of the "mandated" programs in the district allocations, the total still fell short of the amount the districts were entitled to for their own use.

The Results

The announcement of the Board's reallocation of Title I funds created havoc among community districts. Exclusive of changes resulting from the reallocations, major problems arose from the fact that the total amount available for distribution, $110.0 million, was $7.0 million less than had been available the preceding year. In addition, this smaller sum had to pay for additional "More Effective Schools" and substantial increases in both paraprofessional and professional salaries.

The results were disastrous for some districts. District 13, for instance, with two MES schools and other "mandated" programs found that, even though its share of the $16.25 million was enough to pay the one-third share of its "mandated" programs, it only had $140,000 left to pay for $2.1 million worth of locally designed programs for the coming year. Now, only a few weeks before school was to open, it was faced with having to scrap most of these programs and fire hundreds of paraprofessionals who had just been hired the previous year.

The results were aggravated further by the fact that similar dislocations were taking place in the Board's reallocation of State Urban Education funds, and by the Board's "decentralization" of the popular prekindergarten program without giving the local boards any funds to pay for it.

The Consultation Question

Another element in the controversy was the Board of Education's announcement of these drastic changes without effectively consulting with community school boards. The fact that the law expressly required that the distribution formula be developed in consultation with the community boards plus the fact that psychology and politics would seem to dictate consultation as good strategy, make this failure difficult to understand. Moreover, even when the Board did begin to consult with the community boards after the storm broke, the incomplete nature of the information it provided served to exacerbate rather than to ameliorate the situation. It was not until July 23 that figures accounting for all of the $110.0 million for 1970-71 were released; prior to that all that had been available were district totals. There are still no figures available as to actual expenditures of Title I funds, by district or by school in 1969-70. At no time was the Board's distribution formula revealed.

Community Board Reaction

All community boards were allied in their general demands for immediate consultation and the disclosure of full information. Beyond this, various boards took individual positions with respect to the problem: several expressed their intention to bring suit to invalidate the UFT contract commitment; one publicly announced its intention to operate at full program strength despite the cut in funds. Some boards denounced the "mandated" programs as a ploy by the Board of Education to shift the anticipated fight with the UFT from its own shoulders to theirs. Whether or not this is true, the hard reality remains that, if the "mandated" programs had been optional and the funding still insufficient to pay for them as well as for local programs, the community boards would have faced the different, but possibly more uncomfortable problem, of having to choose between competing schools and constituencies in their own districts without having the central Board's mandate to use as an excuse for favoring one set of programs over another.

MORE MONEY AND A NEW "FORMULA"

The anguish of the community boards forced the Board of Education to reconsider its allocations. Consultations went on throughout the summer. On August 16th, the Board informally announced that it anticipated that more money would become available for distribution — but made no announcement of how it would be distributed.[6]

On September 8, 1970, the Board of Education stated that the City now expected $125.0 million in Title I funds[7] and that it planned to distribute it so as to decentralize "as much money as possible in order to improve the equity in the amounts of funds given in line with formulae to all districts over a three-year period" and, as observed in a *New York Times* interview with

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[6]Unofficial sources estimated that the additional money referred to included accruals of funds unexpended in 1969-70, balances from overestimated reserves for contingencies and union wage demands, undistributed "More Effective Schools," and an increased federal appropriation resulting from the overriding by Congress of the President's veto of the education appropriations bill.

[7]See Appendix IV: "Title I, ESEA committed Funds, 1970-71 as of September 1970."

the President of the Board of Education, "to equalize the per-pupil distribution with minimal impact on those districts losing money to others."

The new "formula" to be used was not really a formula. To determine a district's Title I allocation, a comparison was made between (1) what the district would have received this year if procedures used in past years had been followed as against (2) what that district would get under an "ideally equitable formula."[8] If the district would get more under (1) than under (2) the overage would be cut back by one-third each year for three years until the district was at parity. Conversely, the funds released in this fashion would be distributed by formula to districts not yet receiving their "ideally equitable" share until the "ideal" distribution was reached in three years. For example, if under past procedures a district would receive $1.5 million more than its formula share, it would lose $.5 million per year for three years, with that amount going into a central pool to be distributed among the "have-not" districts.

Of the $125 million, a lump sum of $89 million was listed under "Funds Distributed to Districts." Although this might appear to consist completely of money being directly distributed by the foregoing "formula" to the districts for their discretionary use, one suspects that certain restrictions have been placed upon it. In its statement of September 8th, the Board also announced its intention to "provide for the phasing out of central programs over the same period" but nowhere is there specific mention of the hitherto "mandated" programs. The Board has not provided tax-levy funds to pay for them nor has it earmarked any Title I monies for this purpose. One can therefore assume that the Board has taken a roundabout — and illegal — way of having the districts continue to pay for these very unevenly distributed programs out of *their* Title I monies. Additionally, the Board has stated publicly that 7.7 percent of the total City appropriation must be allocated to nonpublic schools. The $4.5 million clearly designated for this purpose falls over $5 million short of this amount. It can be assumed that, in line with statements made by the Board itself, part of the $89 million is really earmarked for use by nonpublic schools for district "plug-in" programs.

Another problem arises from the nature of some of the programs which are to be centrally administered. Listed under "Funds for Central Programs: Special Programs — Public Schools" are the funds for three programs unacknowledged as rightfully belonging under community board control. The programs are "Follow Through" (which takes place in elementary schools under community board jurisdiction), "Spanish Speaking Teachers" (a special program having maximum effect in schools under local jurisdiction), and "Auxiliary Career" (a training program which, while responsive to a federal requirement for "training," usurps the community boards' right to fulfill the requirement themselves out of their own funds). Moreover, under "Other Allocations," is the sum of $3.3 million in a "Chancellor's Fund for Innovative Programs and Activities" which, unless earned by eligible pupils under central jurisdiction and used for them exclusively, is an illegal infringement on funds belonging to community boards.

NOT THE SOLUTION

After making these changes, the Board of Education was still substantially out of compliance with the Decentralization Law. It had violated the law's "jurisdictional" provisions when it retained the "Follow Through" and "Auxiliary Careers" programs to be administered centrally. It had violated the Legislature's formula distribution intent, fundamentally, through its general manipulation of allocations and, specifically, when it made district allocations by comparison with an "ideal formula" based on the free lunch index rather than on ADC; when it retained funds for "Spanish Speaking Teachers" and the "Chancellor's Fund for Innovative Programs and Activities;" possibly, when it allocated funds for central programs without supplying substantiating eligible figures; and again, possibly, when it silently mandated the continuation of certain inequitably distributed programs. Finally, although in some of these areas it was indeed "moving toward" compliance through its three-year phasing plan, there is nothing in the law which would allow it to assume that anything short of immediate and complete compliance was legal.

Despite whatever this extra money and new "formula" might do to relieve the squeeze, it is not the answer so long as fundamental issues are not faced. A "grease the squeaky wheel" approach is likely just to prolong the agony and might actually undo the Board's laudable attempt to promote a more equitable distribution of the funds.

Quite aside from the legal constraints of the Decentralization Law, Title I funds are perhaps the most sensitive area for central Board tampering. Communities fought for local control of Title I funds even before the general decentralization of the city school system. The only real solution is a clean distribution of these funds to the districts on a formula basis, free and clear of central mandates and controls as to how they will be spent, so long as the programs meet federal requirements. Fundamental to this, as required by the Decentralization Law, the formula for distribution to districts should reflect as closely as possible the federal formula on the basis of which New York City receives the funds.

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[8]For 1970-71, the formula considered "ideally equitable" was one based directly on the free lunch index with no initial distribution to boroughs. (See Appendix II for a discussion of the free lunch index as an inaccurate — and hence illegal — measure of federal criteria.) There has been some indication, however, that in future the formula will be based on ADC figures rather than on the free lunch index.

Admittedly, such a policy leaves the Board of Education with a problem as to centrally sponsored programs, such as the "More Effective Schools" and the "Strengthened Early Childhood" programs. We see nothing wrong in principle with the Board of Education encouraging certain special experimental programs, but the only appropriate way in which it might pay or contribute toward the operating expenses of such programs is through funds appropriated to the central Board for this purpose. One possible source for such funds in the future might be special incentive funds for innovative programs provided for under Section 2590 (i) (5) of the Decentralization Law. There is certainly nothing in the UFT contract that would require special programs to be funded out of Title I funds, and wording of the law, common sense, and this year's experience indicate that this may be the least appropriate source of funds for such programs.

APPENDIX I

TITLE I SCHOOL ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

Before September 8, 1970

(Derived from the Board of Education's "Summary of Proposed Programs — 1969-70 — Title I — Elementary and Secondary Education Act.")

A. For a school to be eligible:

(1) 30% or more of its pupils must be eligible for free lunch; or the extent of academic retardation in the school must be similar to that which exists in schools in which 30% or more of the pupils are eligible for free lunch; and

(2) If the school is within a designated poverty area: 50% or more of the pupils must reside within the designated poverty area.
If the school is not within a designated poverty area:

1. The school must be within one mile (high schools), or 750 feet (other schools); and have 50% or more of its pupils reside in the designated poverty areas; or
2. The median reading score in the school must be:
   a. one year or more below the norm in grade 5; or
   b. two years or more below the norm in grade 8; or
   c. two years or more below the norm if in the entering class of high school.

B. Pupils are eligible for Title I services who live in designated poverty areas, but who elect to attend schools outside the poverty areas under an officially sponsored program of integration.

However, mere eligibility for service does not necessarily entitle pupils in a school to service. Factors such as availability of funds and extent of educational deprivation must be considered, and there should be a reasonable relationship between the nature and extent of the services granted and the nature and extent of needs.

All but four of New York's districts were determined eligible to receive Title I funds by virtue of having schools which met the above criteria. The four that were ineligible for Title I funds are: Districts 11 (Bronx), 22 (Brooklyn) and 25 and 26 (Queens).

After September 8, 1970

As of September 8, 1970, new allocations made for the 1970-1971 school year distribute funds to *all* districts—not just to those having "Title I eligible schools." Presumably this was done based on new criteria for meeting federal "targeting" requirements, although these new criteria have not yet been revealed by the Board.

APPENDIX II

THE FREE LUNCH INDEX

Eligibility for free lunch is not determined in any systematic way that would automatically identify all pupils qualifying; rather, the burden is on the students to make application for it. Whether or not they choose to do so depends on such variables as the degree of stigma resulting from the kinds of procedures used in applying for and receiving free lunch, the quality and desirability of the lunch itself, and the willingness of the family to disclose private information. Additional distortions result from the fact that some principals allegedly abuse their discretionary powers to provide free lunch to children who do not meet poverty criteria but who are in "special situations" and, conversely, discourage applications in situations where cafeteria space is limited. Various people on the community boards allege that there are wide discrepancies between figures derived from use of the free lunch index and those derived from census and ADC records.

It should be emphasized that it is the Decentralization Law, not the federal guidelines, which raises the question of the appropriateness of the use of the free lunch index to govern the distribution of funds to the community districts. In fact, although federal money is allocated to the City based on the 1960 census and ADC figures and not on free lunch totals, federal guidelines do permit the use of the free lunch index to determine school eligibility and to govern distribution of funds within local districts when the preferred information is not available. There is no contention about the free lunch index being used in either of these ways because the Decentralization Law does not address itself to them; its formula requirements apply only to distribution *among* the districts.

APPENDIX III

TITLE I ESEA FUNDS AND DISTRIBUTION

		July 23, 1970		
Total Allocation to New York City (Projected)			$110,000,000	(100.0)
Distribution to Districts & Schools			73,105,732	(66.5)
District Designed Open Enrollment		3,846,500		
Mandated Programs		48,505,895		
Strengthened Early Childhood	28,887,000			
More Effective Schools	18,239,000			
Five Primary Schools	1,378,000			
Nonpublic Schools		4,500,000		
Balance of Distribution to Districts		16,253,337		
Central Administration & Evaluation			5,800,000	(5.2)
Central Programs			18,901,019	(17.2)
Follow Through	1,265,019			
Socially Maladjusted	2,500,000			
College Bound	10,500,000			
College Discovery	1,886,000			
Pregnant Teenagers	1,400,000			
Other (including Auxiliary Careers, Spanish Speaking Teachers & Institutionalized Children)	1,350,000			
Contingency Funds			12,193,249	(11.1)
MES (Unassigned to Districts)	2,800,000	(2.5)		
To be distributed to districts for Nonpublic	2,612,505	(2.4)		
Reserve for Innovation & Experimentation	6,780,744	(6.2)		

APPENDIX IV

TITLE I, ESEA-COMMITTED FUNDS, 1970-71 AS OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1970

TOTAL TITLE I, ESEA MONIES AVAILABLE		$125,000,000
1. **FUNDS DISTRIBUTED TO DISTRICTS**		$ 89,007,207
Special Programs — Public Schools		
Follow Through	$ 1,269,229	
Socially Maladjusted	2,500,000	
Institutionalized Children	520,000	
College Bound	10,500,000	
College Discovery	1,886,790	
Pregnant Girls	1,400,000	
Spanish Speaking Teachers	983,549	
Auxiliary Career	125,000	
Special Programs for High Schools	3,000,000	
	$ 22,184,568	
Nonpublic In-School Day Program		
Corrective Reading	$ 1,308,235	
Corrective Mathematics	930,129	
English as a Second Language	238,611	
Handicapped Children	183,440	
Speech Therapy	429,585	
Clinical Guidance	1,300,000	
Field Trips	110,000	
	$ 4,500,000	
		$ 26,684,568
3. **OTHER ALLOCATIONS**		
Central Administration	$ 5,300,000	
Evaluation	700,000	
Chancellor's Fund for Innovative Programs and Activities	3,308,225	
		$ 9,308,225
TOTAL MONIES DISTRIBUTED . .		$125,000,000